Due to the confinement imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic situation, companies adopted remote work more than ever. The rapid rise of remote work also affected local life and many employers introduced or extended their telework activities because of the associated advantages. However, despite the evident positive benefits, some employees were pressured to work remotely while ill. This evidence brought new challenges to the presenteeism literature. This article investigates how individual, economic/societal, and organizational/sectorial/supervisory-related variables can moderate the role of a contagious (...) disease, such as the COVID-19, in explaining presenteeism behavior. Moreover, the current research presents a multi-level conceptual model to describe how a new construct of remote-work presenteeism behavior mediates the relationship between different post pandemic health conditions and future cumulative negative consequences. The authors suggested that the widespread pervasive adoption of remote work because of COVID-19 has important implications for the presenteeism literature and opens avenues for further research. (shrink)

The ArgumentStarting from the thesis that a science constructs the knowledge of the part of the world allotted to it, the present paper aims at bringing together all the various aspects of physics under a unified conceptual framework — that provided by the Marxian concept “mode of production.” After an introduction providing the initial plausibility grounds for the undertaking, the concept is analyzed into its conceptual elements in Part I of the paper. The analysis presents the reconstruction initiated by Louis (...) Althusser and developed by his followers. Part II starts from a characterization of physical problems. This offers a basis for “reading” physics in the terms introduced in Part I. The rest of Part II is devoted to the identification of all the aspects of physics with the conceptual elements in question. The paper aims at three things: to uncover the connections holding among seemingly disparate aspects of physics, usually discussed in almost total independence from each other; to take full account of the social dimensions of physics without vindicating social constructivism; to show that the boundaries separating the disciplines of philosophy, history and sociology of science are more arbitrary than usually considered. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege's system in the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. Frege's instantiation rule for the second-order universal quantifier makes his system, except for minor differences, full (i.e., with unrestricted comprehension) second-order logic, augmented by an abstraction operator that abides to Frege's basic law V. A few years ago, Richard Heck proved the consistency of the fragment of Frege's theory obtained by restricting the comprehension schema to predicative formulae. He further conjectured that the more encompassing Δ₁¹-comprehension (...) schema would already be inconsistent. In the present paper, we show that this is not the case. (shrink)

I argue that newborn infants are conscious. I propose a methodology for investigating infant consciousness, and I present two approaches for determining whether newborns are conscious. First, I consider behavioral and neurobiological markers of consciousness. Second, I investigate the major theories of consciousness, including both philosophical and scientific theories, and I discuss what they predict about infant consciousness.

As the use of algorithmic decision‐making becomes more commonplace, so too does the worry that these algorithms are often inscrutable and our use of them is a threat to our agency. Since we do not understand why an inscrutable process recommends one option over another, we lose our ability to judge whether the guidance is appropriate and are vulnerable to being led astray. In response, I claim that a process being inscrutable does not automatically make its guidance inappropriate. This phenomenon (...) is not restricted to algorithms, and there are many social processes which we should conform to but are similarly unable to judge for ourselves. I provide a framework for how we can depend on inscrutable processes by introducing a distinction between knowing conformity (where I understand what justifies the guidance) from mere conformity (where I merely do what I am told) and showing how mere conformity is often positively valuable because it allows for extended processes that in turn allow us to accomplish more than we could on our own. This is in effect a division of deliberative labour, which I argue is something commonplace but not often recognised, of which algorithmic guidance can be an example. (shrink)

Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based oncontext-independent choicesand the other based onreason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of (...) welfare than context-independent and reason-based choices. Finally, I discuss the implications of these arguments fornudgesandboosts. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to offer an interpretation about the explanation of the (relative) idea of pure substance in general on John Locke’s philosophy, from Thomas Reid’s notion of ‘natural suggestion’. To achieve this aim, after contextualizing Locke’s notion of pure substance in general and distinguishing it from the idea of particular substance (section 1), we explicit that Locke’s words about the source of the idea of the former in the mind (either empirical or rational) are ambiguous and inconclusive (...) (section 2). Then, we argue that the parallels between this idea and that of ‘relation’, as well as of ‘power’ do not assist in that answer, due to some problems we identify on them (section 3). Finally, we argue that the Reidian explanation for the source of the idea of ‘mind’, from the notion of ‘natural suggestion’ allows us to i) avoid those problems and ii) inasmuch as, according to this interpretation, the idea of pure substance in general would have an empirical source, Lockian empiricism would remain intact (section 4). (shrink)

A prevailing view in moral psychology holds that empathy and sympathy play key roles in morality and in prosocial and altruistic actions. Recently, Jesse Prinz (2011a, 2011b) has challenged this view and has argued that empathy does not play a foundational or causal role in morality. He suggests that in fact the presence of empathetic emotions is harmful to morality. Prinz rejects all theories that connect empathy and morality as a constitutional, epistemological, developmental, motivational, or normative necessity. I consider two (...) of Prinz’s theses: the thesis that empathy is not necessary for moral development, and the thesis that empathy should be avoided as a guide for morality. Based on recent research in moral psychology, I argue that empathy plays a crucial role in development of moral agency. I also argue that empathy is desirable as a moral emotion. (shrink)

In Frege’s logicism, numbers are logical objects in the sense that they are extensions of certain concepts. Frege’s logical system is inconsistent, but Richard Heck showed that its restriction to predicative quantification is consistent. This predicative fragment is, nevertheless, too weak to develop arithmetic. In this paper, I will consider an extension of Heck’s system with impredicative quantifiers. In this extended system, both predicative and impredicative quantifiers co-exist but it is only permissible to take extensions of concepts formulated in the (...) predicative fragment of the language. This system is consistent. Moreover, it proves the principle of reducibility applied to concepts true of only finitely many objects. With the aid of this form of reducibility, it is possible to develop arithmetic in a thoroughly Fregean way. (shrink)

Much has been made of the Kierkegaardian flavour of Wittgenstein's thought on religion, both with respect to its explicit allusions to Kierkegaard and its implicit appeals. Even when significant disparities between the two are noted, there remains an important core of de facto methodological agreement between them, addressing the limits of theory and the dispelling of illusion. The categories of ‘nonsense’ and ‘paradox’ are central to Wittgenstein's therapeutic enterprise, while the categories of ‘paradox’ and the ‘absurd’ are central to much (...) of Kierkegaard's attempt to dispel religious illusion. Writing of how the ‘urge to thrust against the limits of language’ yields ‘nonsense’, Wittgenstein explicitly appealed to Kierkegaard: ‘Kierkegaard, too, recognized this thrust and even described it in much the same way ’. 1 I want to consider whether Kierkegaard's category of paradox of the absurd is assimilable to Wittgenstein's view of nonsense and paradox. I shall argue that a consideration of Wittgenstein's view of paradox can highlight contrasting strands in Kierkegaard's writings on religious faith, strands which take paradox more or less strictly – in particular, it can clarify several different opinions concerning the status of religious claims. My exploration will bring to the fore some implications of the attempt to make room, in the religious employment of language, for a ‘higher understanding’ of truths which we are said to be able to grasp but cannot express. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Natural History: Religion and "Explanation" M. JAMIE FERREIRA HUME'S BOLDLYSIMPLESTATEMENTof the genesis of religion--that "the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst for revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries" led humankind to see "the first obscure traces of divinity"--is supported by appeals to what he considers plain common sense.' For example, given that at "the first origin (...) of society" (e4) our ancestors were obviously "ignorant and barbarous" (23), anxiously helpless in the face of threatening natural events--hence, obviously with neither the leisure nor the impulse nor the aptitude for serious reflection--it was obviously passionate fears and hopes, not reason, which motivated their beliefs. Given that the mind obviously "rises from inferior to superior," and that humankind obviouslyhasn't "inhabited palaces before huts and cottages or studied geometry before agriculture" (~4), polytheism obviously antedated monotheism. In the course of detailing his commonsensical account of the origin and development of religion, Hume highlights a wide variety of natural tendencies, principles, and propensities which are operative. Keith Yandell offers a recent reading of one such propensity at work in the origin of religion--namely, what Hume calls the "propensity of human nature, which leads into a system, that gives them some satisfaction" (29)--and Yandell explicitly takes it to be a propensity to an "explanatory" system.2 I want to argue in what follows that any reading of Hume's account of religion which highlights an explanatory motivation can be significantly misleading insofar as it obscures the way in which Hume's account differs markedly from other classical genetic accounts which emphasize explanation. ' The Natural History ofReligion, ed. H. E. Root (Stanford, CA, 1956), 28. Further parenthetical page references in the text will be to this work. His later formulation--"The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events" (65)--recalls Philo's pithy version, namely, "terror is the primary principle of religion" (Dialoguesconcerning Natural Religion, XII). ~Hume's "Inexplicable Mystery": His Views on Religion (Philadelphia, 199o), 9. Hereafter HIM. [5931 594 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 In his account of the "propensity of human nature, which leads into a system, that gives them some satisfaction," Yandell admits that "no explanation is given of exactly what sort of satisfaction is in question," yet he goes on without a pause to speak of how "people accept different and various explanatory systems"; referring to a natural "propensity to understand," he concludes that "for Hume, we need not accept a religious system of explanation, but most of us in fact do so."s I suggest that Yandell's shift from "system" to "explanatory system," which is unheralded, is of crucial significance because the emphasis on explanation tends to call to a reader's mind just the sort of appeal which Hume decisively rejects. I shall argue that Hume draws our attention to and decisively excludes from his account a concept of explanation which actually does play an important role in other parallel accounts--namely, a concept which focuses on the integrity of a broad picture and an ultimate accounting; Hume points to such a concept in his references to the "frame of the universe," "final causes," and the "first rise of the visible system." Such a role might seem to elaborate Hume's appeal to common sense--after all, isn't the natural response to "unknown causes" to try to understand them, and isn't the attempt to understand them the same as looking for an "ultimate" explanation, however crude it might be at the outset? Although this might seem commonsensical to others (as we shall see), I want to argue that what Hume sees at work in the origin of religion is not a search for such an explanation, even a crude one. Rather, on Hume's view the only curiosity at work is a curiosity about how to cope: the propensity to a system is the propensity to the kind of determinacy which is expedient for control, and the only satisfaction the system provides is one in terms of a coping which is independent of truth-seeking... (shrink)

During the last few decades, the historical turn within the tradition of the analytic tradition has experienced growing enthusiasm concerning the procedure of rational reconstruction, whose validity or importance, despite its paradigmatic examples in Frege and Russell, has not always enjoyed a consensus. Among the analytic philosophers who are the frontrunners of this movement, Robert Brandom is one of a kind: his work on Hegel as well as on German Idealism has been increasing interest in, as well as awareness of, (...) Hegel´s possible contributions to some current problems in that tradition, and connecting Hegel scholars to current questions. Thus, this work aims to explore Brandom´s methodology of rational reconstruction, as well as his dialogue with history of Philosophy, mainly exposed in his Tales of the mighty dead (2002). As we will see, Brandom´s distinction between a de dicto and a de re approach intends to present a way of identifying and analyzing a given philosopher´s theoretical (hidden) commitments that can be useful to improve the quality of the dialogue with past philosophers. From such methodological exposition, I to turn to Kierkegaard in order to make explicit some of his ontological commitments and presenting Brandom’s approach as a valuable tool for doing history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper architectural forms are presented as symbolic forms issued from the complex semiosis that characterises human cognition (Ferreira (2007, 2010)). Being semiotic objects, these symbolic forms are, consequently, context- dependent_they emerge and have meaning, i.e., they are assigned a functional and/or aesthetic value, in particular physical, social and cultural frameworks. As it happens with all semiotic objects, architectural forms, whatever their nature, are not static but highly interactive. In fact, they act as agents of specific semiotic processes, (...) engaged in a permanent dialectic relationship with the environment they are embedded in. From this dialectics important physical, social, cultural and economic changes frequently arise, redefining this way the original framework for decades to come. As Pallasmaa (2009) points out: “Architecture is existentially rooted, and it expresses fundamental existential experiences, the complex condensation of how it feels to be human being in this world. Architecture grounds and frames existence and creates specific horizons of perception, understanding and identity.” Architecture happens in the context of particular landscapes both natural and man-made, individuating spaces, assigning them an identity, turning the frequently undifferentiated physical environment into “locus”, “place”, “site”, “ort”, definitely contributing to the definition of the mental map that individual minds are able to share collectively. The fundamental role played by architectural forms in the definition of “place” and identity and in the shaping or reshaping of a physical, social and cultural environment is analysed in this paper through a case study that observes the consequences of this dynamics in the development of the social and cultural tissue of a particular city. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics has always proved to be fertile ground for at times needless textual emendation. I provide a translation and running commentary on Eudemian Ethics II 2 1220a39–b6 in accordance with the MSS text.

Freud held complex and fascinating views on the question of mental causation. In this chapter, I propose an interpretation of Freud's views on this question, bringing together ideas from psychoanalysis, philosophy of psychoanalysis, and philosophy of mind. Faced with the impasse of the problem of how the mind interacts with the body, Freud created a two-dimensional picture of mental causation, with one dimension involving mechanistic causes and the other involving intentional causes. My thesis is that Freud's best-developed picture of mental (...) causation thesis describes mental causes as intentional causes using psychological vocabulary. I analyze three moments in Freud's work with a focus on mental causation. In the first topography, Freud uses a hybrid vocabulary, describing the mind in terms of both mechanistic causes and intentional causes. In his second topography, the mind increasingly assumes an intentional description. The third moment is Freud’s theory of anxiety, in which the arational cause of the unconscious drives, initially presented as a motor of the mind, gives rise to anxiety as an affective state that forces the self to find a solution for its mental conflicts. In the last part, I argue that Freud’s theory gradually moves from a reductionist approach to the mind-body problem on which mental causation is understood in terms of physical mechanisms, to a non-reductionist view where the mental becomes causally efficacious in its own right. (shrink)

Every model of IΔ0 is the tally part of a model of the stringlanguage theory Th-FO . We show how to “smoothly” introduce in Th-FO the binary length function, whereby it is possible to make exponential assumptions in models of Th-FO. These considerations entail that every model of IΔ0 + ¬exp is a proper initial segment of a model of Th-FO and that a modicum of bounded collection is true in these models.

Kierkegaard's "Works of Love" provocatively presses for a reconsideration of impartiality, partiality, and equality. Past readings of this text have typically (1) criticized its focus on the abstract category of "human being," ignoring its attention to distinctiveness and difference; (2) defended it from the charge of abstraction by accenting its treatment of distinctiveness and difference, playing down its assumptions about the "essentially" human; (3) acknowledged its emphases on both essence and difference, arguing that they are incompatible and irreconcilable; or (4) (...) acknowledged both emphases, assuming they are compatible without exploring or accounting for the apparent incompatibility. As a means of resolving this seeming inconsistency, I will focus on Kierkegaard's recommendation of moral blindness and its implications for moral vision, and I will argue that "Works of Love" contains resources for an understanding of impartiality that allows moral attention to concrete difference. (shrink)

Human subjects research is an annual $10 billion dollar global activity. In May 2012, Harvard Law School hosted a conference on human subjects research . The conference critically examined HSR relative to the proposed American regulatory framework for federally funded research. The conference did not question the need for human subjects research. Rather, it discussed the need to balance the protection of human subjects from possible research risks while not hindering research—an epic, ongoing debate regarding the balance between paternalism and (...) autonomy. This book draws on the analysis and insights of 33 experts in the field of HSR. The authors critically analyse the epic balance in five parts:‘The Regulation of Risk’, ‘The Protection of Vulnerable Populations’, ‘Re-defining the Participant-Researcher Relationship and the Role of IRBs’, ‘Specimens, Data and Privacy’, and ‘Paradigm Shifts in Research Ethics’. Within each part, the authors sketch out their preferr .. (shrink)

"Each nation can do well, as in the life of individuals, only if things go equally well in all of her neighboring nations; the life of sciences is similar to that of states whose interest demands that everything be in order within individual states as properly as their relations be in good order among themselves. Understanding this correctly, the most important carriers of mathematical thoughts have always shown great interest in the law and order in neighboring sciences and, above all (...) for the benefit of mathematics, have cultivated the relations to the neighboring sciences, in particular to physics and epistemology. The essence of these relations and the ground of their fertility will be made most distinct, I believe, if I sketch to you that general method of inquiry which appears to grow more and more significant in modern mathematics; the axiomatic method, I mean." (David Hilbert, 1917). (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard and John Henry Newman have starkly opposed formulations of the relation between faith and reason. In this essay I focus on a possible convergence in their respective understandings of the transition to religious belief or faith, as embodied in metaphors they use for a qualitative transition. I explore the ways in which attention to the legitimate dimension of discontinuity highlighted by the Climacan metaphor of the 'leap' can illuminate Newman 's use of the metaphor of a 'polygon inscribed (...) in a circle', as well as the ways in which Newman 's metaphor can illuminate the dimension of continuity operative in the Climacan appreciation of qualitative transition. (shrink)

n this thesis I describe how conventions specify how to put normative principles into practice. I identify a class of recurring situations where there are some given normative principles in effect, but they underdetermine what each individual should do, and what is best for an individual depends on what others do. I demonstrate that in such cases, whenever the community develops a response that repeatedly brings them to as good an outcome as is available according to their principles, that response (...) is a Lewisian convention where the benefit of an outcome to each individual is measured by the extent to which it conforms to the principles they subscribe to. Since these conventions are constrained by the normative principles, I call them limited conventions. They are supplements to the principles, and are ineradicably involved in moral action insofar as the abovementioned cases of moral underdetermination are in play. That has the consequence that in these cases the only reliable way to follow your principles is to follow the relevant conventions. As examples of this mechanism I offer a conventionalist analysis of authority, such that the commands of an authority is normative when they instantiate a limited convention, and of the variation in understandings of virtue and vice across societies, such that the evaluative vocabulary of each society is a set of different limited conventions about how to express in word and deed the evaluative points of the virtues and vices in question. Finally, I discuss how conventions and similar forms of guidance provide a way for individuals to participate in their community’s moral life without having a full understanding of the principles that underlie it, or even if they are profoundly ignorant or outright mistaken about the demands of morality. (shrink)

I suggest here ecologies of the nascent state, posing the following general questions: what is this state and what is it to live, to fabricate modes of life, in its immanence? I believe populating this state is, by right, ‘ecological’, even if what I offer here is only a sketch or glimpse, playful as it is, of the possibility of such modes of life, of dwelling. As I develop it here, the nascent is in flight of being. It is populated (...) by lesser, minoritarian existences. If it is ‘ecological’, it is because these existences, or modes of becoming, are themselves, in their own right, ‘ecologies’, that is, modes of dwelling, of life, on the ‘other side of existence’, as Antonin Artaud put it once, in exile from Being. The power to return eternally to the nascent state is the power to live, to dwell, in the absolute forgetfulness of Being, in the interstice where philosophy supposedly ends, but where it nevertheless begins again, in oblivion itself, where being is never already the verticality of Being, its difference with beings, but always nascent, in the beginning, eternally so. (shrink)

At more than five-hundred pages, this volume — the first in a set of five — is neither a short nor an easy read. Most will, I suspect, treat the book as a reference work, consulting only those sections relevant to their study. But its materials are sometimes demanding; and in several chapters readers will encounter considerable interpretive difficulties. I shall have more to say about these difficulties further down. First, though, a few comments on the book’s contents.

This chapter is devoted to reflecting on the role of empathy in interactions with people with profound intellectual disabilities. We have a duty to respect people with intellectual disabilities. Respect involves identification with a point of view. We owe them an effort at identification with their perspective. However, if intellectually disabled people’s communicative abilities are impaired, our apprehension of their point of view might be limited, reducing our ability to identify with them and respect them. To answer this challenge, I (...) appeal to empathy. Through imaginative empathy, we can learn to identify with their perspectives. I argue that empathy is a good moral guide and can be helpful in developing respectful attitudes toward people with profound intellectual disabilities. (shrink)

Wittgenstein afirma no Tractatus que a teoria das classes é supérflua na Matemática e que isso está relacionado ao fato de que a generalidade exigida pela Matemática não é “acidental” (TLP 6.031). O objetivo deste texto é elucidar essa afirmação chamando a atenção para o que, seguindo Gregory Landini, tomaremos como uma forma de Logicismo compartilhada por Frege e Russell. Esta forma de Logicismo tem dois princípios básicos, a saber: o uso de uma teoria lógica cujas variáveis estruturadas incorporam o (...) que hoje chamamos de teoria dos tipos simples e a análise de atribuições numéricas em termos de afirmações sobre conceitos ou atributos que empregam conceitos de ordem superior exatamente análogos aos chamados quantificadores ‘numericamente definidos’. Argumentamos que é esse arcabouço teórico que Wittgenstein está rejeitando em 6.031 e não apenas o uso da Teoria dos Conjuntos na Matemática. Também é defendido que a noção de classe ainda tem um papel essencial a desempenhar no Tractatus.AbstractWittgenstein claims in the Tractatus that the theory of classes is superfluous in Mathematics and that this is related to the fact that the generality required by Mathematics is not “accidental” (TLP 6.031). My aim in this paper is to elucidate this claim by calling attention to what, following Gregory Landini, I refer to as a form of Logicism shared by Frege and Russell. This form of Logicism has two main tenets, namely:the use of a logical theory whose structured variables embody what we nowadays call the simple theory of types and the analysis of number ascriptions in terms of assertions about concepts or attributes which employ higher-order concepts exactly analogous to so-called ‘numerically definite’ quantifiers. It is argued that it is this shared theoretical framework that Wittgenstein is rejecting in 6.031 and not just the use of Set Theory in Mathematics. It is also argued that the notion of class still has an essential role to play in the Tractatus. (shrink)

The present text discusses whether there is a tension between aphorisms 6.1-6.13 of the Tractatus and the Church-Turing theorem about the decidability of predicate logic. We attempt to establish the following points: (i) Aphorisms 6.1-6.13 are not consistent with the Church-Turing theorem. (ii) The logical symbolism of the Tractatus, built from the N-operator, can (and should) be interpreted as expressively complete with respect to first-order formulas. (iii) Wittgenstein’s reasons for believing that Logic is decidable were purely philosophical and the undecidability (...) result shows that there are aspects of his criticisms of Frege and Russell that become unjustified in light of these results. (shrink)

Can the brain become mind? If the question seems strange, aberrant even, it is perhaps due to the way the problem brain–mind is commonly presented, where what's repeatedly asked is whether the brain is or isn’t ‘mind’. Yet, if we take Deleuze and Guattari's provocation seriously, in the Conclusion of What is Philosophy?, the problem is radically recast: even if speculatively, that is, properly philosophically or conceptually, the brain, for them, involves its own becoming, both in terms of its ‘becoming-subject’ (...) and ‘becoming-mind’, as ‘Thought-brain’. I will explore references within Deleuze's philosophy in relation to the brain, namely in The Logic of Sense and his work on cinema, as I try to work out what this fantastic story (with necropolitical undertones) may in fact look like, the one where the brain not simply is but becomes, and in becoming, becomes mind…. (shrink)

Any complete theory of lexical access in production must address how words are produced in prosodic contexts. Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer make some progress on this point: for example, they discuss resyllabification in multiword utterances. I present work demonstrating that word articulation takes into account overall prosodic context. This research supports Levelt et al.'s hypothesized separation between metrical and segmental information.

As regular readers of The Pluralist are aware, there appeared in 2008 an issue devoted to Jan Olof Bengtsson's The Worldview of Personalism.1 The issue included five articles, each concerned with a different aspect of the book; and after each article, there was a "Reply" by Bengtsson. In what follows, I shall say something about Bengtsson's reply to my own contribution, "Absolute and Personal Idealism." However, first let me briefly describe that article's argument.In "Absolute and Personal Idealism," I examined the (...) personalist attack on absolutism as formulated by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison in two works: Hegelianism and Personality and The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. In the first section of .. (shrink)

I find it hard to understand what can be meant by ‘mestiço (mixed-race) art’.No one disputes that the Brazilian people are of mixed race, but even if this is the case, the idea that their artistic creations should also be ‘mestiço’ seems to be an argument that may be logical but is unverifiable in practice.The first difficulty is that I can see no causal relationship between an individual's racial make-up and the character of the object he or she produces or (...) creates. In my view human individuals are essentially cultural. So it is on the cultural level that they are defined and their creations described. From this it can be concluded that if a mulatto transmits something of his mulatice (‘mulatto-ness’) to his art, this has nothing to do with the type of blood flowing in his veins, but is related to the influence that his position as a mulatto has on his world view, if indeed he has one. Personally I can see no sign of it in the work of Machado de Assis, for example. Should writers' social and racial position influence their work? Of course. But not to the extent that it becomes visible and less still so that it determines the quality or meaning of the work. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an overview of the logical doctrine of three prominent idealists: T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet. I first identify the works in which this doctrine is developed; then I provide a general account of judgment, and inference. In my discussion of judgment I examine, the individual, hypothetical, and disjunctive forms as well as negation. In my examination of inference I compare the “nonlinear” and “linear” views. This comparison includes the idealist critique of syllogism, and (...) the theory of the association of ideas. I conclude with a brief discussion of idealism and formal logic. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to examine what I believe is an often misunderstood aspect of F.H. Bradley’s philosophy. Specifically, I want to consider Bradley’s views on the relation between perception and what he calls the “feeling base” of experience. Although Bradley’s doctrine of feeling is generally recognized as one of the most distinctive aspects of his thought, his theory of perception is, I believe, also unusual in that it views our perceptual experience as permeated by conceptual identities. As (...) we shall see, Bradley understands perception as essentially ideal. And when he uses this term to describe the contents of our ordinary perceptual awareness, Bradley wants to convey to us his belief that there is something about perception which bears the mark of thought. “Ideal” and “ideality” — terms which signal the presence of thought — are also used by Bradley to indicate that an experience is at least partially abstract and general. Thus when he calls perception ideal he is claiming — contrary to the received view — that perception does not present us with objects that are wholly determinate and particular. (shrink)

In this thesis I focus on F. H. Bradley's theory of judgment and his doctrine of predication. My goal is to present an account of Bradley's views which pays special attention to his belief that all logical predication must necessarily fail to accomplish what it sets out to do. All assertion , we are told, attempts to state truth, whole and complete; but, in the end, it must fall short. All judgment, Bradley claims, must contain an element of untruth or (...) falsity. And the outcome of this theory of predication is a doctrine of "degrees of truth". No truth is understood as entirely true or entirely false; rather, each has a position in a hierarchy of truths with some being truer than others when measured against the theoretical criterion of absolute knowledge. ;But, this is not to be understood as a sceptical doctrine. I argue that Bradley's doctrine of predicative failure should be seen as the only means by which radical scepticism in the theory of knowledge can be avoided. If we were capable of possessing truths which are whole and complete unto themselves then there would exist no legitimate basis upon which the inferential development of thought could expand beyond a self-enclosed circle. ;In this essay I also examine a persisting historical problem. It is my claim that Bradley's theory should be understood as a continuation of and development within the British neo-Kantian tradition. Bradley's association with this tradition has sometimes been questioned based on scattered statements found in the 1883 edition of the Principles of Logic. Collectively these statements have been referred to as the doctrine of "floating ideas". However, I maintain that the doctrine of floating ideas must be distinguished from the theory of predicative failure . I argue that the two theories should in no way be identified and that certain misinterpretations of Bradley's position have resulted from confusing these two incompatible views. (shrink)

Neste artigo, pretendemos defender a tese segundo a qual julgamentos sociais se iniciam com a percepção emocional e com o processamento de informações emocionais no reconhecimento de expressões faciais. Para tanto, revisaremos modelos que discutem (i) os mecanismos pelos quais as expressões faciais são codificadas para transmitir informações e ser percebidas pelos outros, (ii) os mecanismos perceptivos de decodificação e categorização de expressões faciais e, por fim, (iii) os mecanismos pelos quais o reconhecimento de expressões faciais geram respostas emocionais e (...) ajustes comportamentais e, por fim, (iv) a eficiência de nosso sistema perceptual na decodificação desses processos. Com essa discussão, nossa intenção é a de (i) explicitar em que sentido nossa percepção emocional de expressões faciais é u m dos principais mecanismos evolutivos de regulação da vida e que (ii) o processamento de informações emocionais é um poderoso instrumento para assegurar a sobrevivência e sustentar razoáveis interações sociais. (shrink)

One of the most basic functions of human language is to convey who did what to whom. In the world's languages, the order of these three constituents (subject [S], verb [V], and object [O]) is uneven, with SOV and SVO being most common. Recent experiments using experimentally elicited pantomime provide a possible explanation of the prevalence of SOV, but extant explanations for the prevalence of SVO could benefit from further empirical support. Here, we test whether SVO might emerge because (a) (...) SOV is not well suited for describing reversible events (a woman pushing a boy) and (b) pressures to be efficient and mention subjects before objects conspire to rule out many other alternatives. We tested this by asking participants to describe reversible and non‐reversible events in pantomime, and we instructed some participants to be consistent in the form of their gestures and to teach them to the experimenter. These manipulations led to the emergence of SVO in speakers of both English (SVO) and Turkish (SOV). (shrink)

Kierkegaard is usually read as a defender of some kind of relativism due to his frequent statements on subjectivity. Nevertheless, if we go deeper into his works, it is possible to see that his position is much more puzzling. In fact, if it is true that the concept of subjectivity plays a central role in his thought, it is also true that the Danish philosopher does not endorse a relativistic view on knowledge, but he argues for a realistic understanding of (...) the nature of certain kinds of thoughts. Accordingly, what emerges from the necessary relation between existence and thought is philosophically more sophisticated than the view we could call the ‘standard reading’ of Kierkegaard’s epistemological positions. In this paper, I aim to show that Kierkegaard’s reflections on knowledge embrace a higher order impasse that is not solved by the standard division between “objective-inessential” and ‘subjectiveessential’ knowledge. Notwithstanding, this impasse opens some new perspectives on the issue. (shrink)

Two questions about infant consciousness are especially central. First: are infants conscious? Second: what is infants’ conscious experience like? In previous work, I have addressed the first, arguing that newborn babies are conscious at birth and that it is possible to know something about what infants’ experiences are like. In this talk, I address the second, investigating the phenomenal structure of infant consciousness. I discuss whether infants have a rich or a minimal phenomenology. The current consensus is that infants have (...) perceptual experiences and experiences of pain and pleasure. But, do they have other types of phenomenology? Using Kriegel’s framework from The Varieties of Consciousness (2015), I explore whether infants have sensory phenomenology, cognitive phenomenology, imaginative phenomenology, emotional phenomenology, and agentive phenomenology. I also address the question of what is the phenomenal background of infants’ first-person experiences, and whether or not they have a minimal pre-reflexive structure of consciousness. (shrink)

RESUMO A definição de arte desenvolvida por Arthur Danto pressupõe que algo é uma obra de arte por ser o correlato de uma interpretação, inscrita em uma rede de significações históricas, teóricas e sociais, que lhe atribui o estatuto de obra de arte. Trata-se de uma definição essencialista que, no entanto, não se funda em algo que é percebido no objeto, mas no objeto percebido como arte. Levando em consideração que o conceito de “interpretação” é um dos pontos cardinais da (...) definição de arte de Danto, aprofundo neste artigo uma investigação específica sobre o assunto. Argumento que o modo como o autor o desenvolve comporta uma ambiguidade, isto é, que há uma confusão entre dois sentidos de interpretação nos textos dantianos, e que seu papel fundamental na definição de arte é inseparável da contextualização histórico-social possibilitada pelo mundo da arte. ABSTRACT Arthur Danto’s definition of art claims that something is a work of art because it is the subject of an interpretation that is inscribed in a network of historical, theoretical and social meanings, which is responsible for assigning the status of artwork. It is an essentialist definition which however, is not based on something that is perceived in the object, but on the object being perceived as art. In this paper, I develop a specific investigation about the concept of “interpretation”, taking into account that it is one of the cardinal points in Danto’s definition of art. I argue that the author develops this subject in an ambiguous way, in other words, that there is confusion between two different meanings of interpretation in his texts, and that its fundamental role in the definition of art is inseparable from the historical and social contextualization guaranteed by the artworld. (shrink)

F.H. Bradley has been characterized by many commentators as something of a sceptic. And the reason why Bradley is often cast in this light is, I believe, largely a result of his theory of relations. As even the casual student is aware, the relational nature of all judgment leads, on Bradley’s analysis, to an infinite and, many have claimed, “vicious” regress. And when we add to this Bradley’s claim that all assertion is, at some level, “contradictory”, there seems to be (...) good reason for the sceptical moniker. What I would like to suggest in this paper, though, is that Bradley’s “scepticism” is not what it seems. Hence in what follows I shall argue that Bradley’s views on contradiction and contrariety are actually important aspects of his larger theory of knowledge; and, as such, they should be understood — not as doctrines whose intent is the condemnation of our ordinary inferences — but, rather, as a crucial component in the defense of such practices. What I hope to show, then, is that, far from being an endorsement of radical scepticism, Bradley’s theory of contradiction and contrariety is an effort to preserve the continuity between one judgment and another — a continuity that he sees as necessary to any coherent account of inference. But first some preliminaries. (shrink)

Evidence shows that knowledge concerning medicinal plants is heterogeneous, as the majority of people in a medical system know only a few plants. This heterogeneity may make sense from an adaptive viewpoint, as human beings tend to keep a small set of information that offers adaptive advantages because our brains can store limited amounts of data. From this scenario, we developed the structural core concept for medical systems: a group of medicinal plants with adaptive characteristics that affect the structure and (...) function of medical systems. We created a set of hypotheses based on the structural core concept to guide future studies investigating the structure and dynamics of local medical systems. Concerning the dynamics of medical systems, we suggest that the structural core is the part of the system that changes least over time, i.e., it is the most conservative. Thus, we can expect that species substitution events mainly occur outside of the structural core. From the medical system structure, we indicate that core plants tend to be favored in the transmission of knowledge. These plants also serve as a model for the selection of novel medicinal plants and are therefore an important factor for the medical system structure. Analysis of the structural core can help the understanding of the structure and dynamics of medical systems and can aid future bioprospecting studies, which can search for plants with pharmacological potential using the structural core. (shrink)

This paper presents a new method - which does not rely on the cut-elimination theorem - for characterizing the provably total functions of certain intuitionistic subsystems of arithmetic. The new method hinges on a realizability argument within an infinitary language. We illustrate the method for the intuitionistic counterpart of Buss's theory Smath image, and we briefly sketch it for the other levels of bounded arithmetic and for the theory IΣ1.

Despite renewed interest in T.H. Green’s social and political theory, little attention has as yet been given to his metaphysics and epistemology — even more neglected, though, are his views on logical matters. It is unclear why this is. I suspect that the obscurity of his discussion has much to do with it. Green routinely refers to writers in whom there is little interest today; and a good deal of effort is required to penetrate his technical vocabulary. Still, I believe (...) we miss something important when we ignore his specifically logical writings. Green has much to say about classical syllogism and its influence on his contemporaries. And, while the discussion is always grounded in his own idealist theory of knowledge, Green’s analysis often reveals surprising aspects of the problem being considered. In what follows, then, I shall consider one such analysis: his account of the logical/epistemological doctrine of Sir William Hamilton and H.L. Mansel — individuals whose writings, in Green’s eyes, made apparent all that was wrong with the “formal logic” of the day. (shrink)